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In a coordination game with many players, the payoﬀ that a particular strategy generates is a
nondecreasing function of the number of players who adopt that strategy. This class of games
can be used to model a number of economic environments with strategic complementarities
(e.g., Cooper 1999, Schelling 1978). For example, consider a situation in which there are sev-
eral distinct technical standards of an emerging network product. If there are n producers in
the market, each facing a problem in determining which standard it adopts for its product,
then their environment deﬁnes an n-person coordination game. Another example is a decision
problem over multiple alternatives in a project team consisting of n members. The charac-
teristic feature of these environments is, of course, the presence of multiple strict equilibria.
Which equilibrium, if any, is the robust prediction of the model? To deal with the equilibrium
selection problem, a systematic analysis is called for.
This paper investigates the equilibrium selection problem in n-person asymmetric binary
coordination games by means of the stochastic evolution analysis introduced by Foster and
Young (1991), Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) and Young (1993). The main contributions
are as follows. First, we develop a systematic analysis into stochastic evolution of many-person
stage games, and compare our results with existing results. Second, we explicitly address the
qualitative diﬀerence between selection results obtained in stochastic evolution models with
multi-dimensional state spaces and those in models with single dimensional state spaces, and
shed some light on the source of the diﬀerence. For evolutionary analyses that built around the
versions of replicator dynamics, it is well known that there are qualitative diﬀerence between
multi-population and single population models (e.g., Weibull 1995). However, it does not
appear to be well recognized that an analogous diﬀerence is present for stochastic evolution
models. Our analysis is based on the formulations of and the investigations into appropriate
linear and non-linear minimization programs, which formalize the familiar mistake counting
argument. Authors have proposed varieties of dynamics that employ the mistake counting
argument. Each dynamic requires a particular minimization program that corresponds to
the mistake counting in that particular dynamic. In this paper, we focus on the following
dynamics: adaptive play (Young 1993), multi-population random matching (Young 1998), and
single population random matching (Kandori et al 1993, Kim 1996).
Although the stochastic evolution has grown into an established literature, it should be
stressed that the focus of the paper is on the class of games that appears to have been almost
left untouched: asymmetric, many-person games. To the best of our knowledge, the explicit
equilibrium selection results obtained thus far restrict the stage game to be either symmetric,
1two-person, or both.1 In contrast, the present paper develops a systematic analysis of n-
person games. To keep the analysis tractable we restrict our attention to a binary coordination
game, in which each player has only two strategies and the two unanimous strategy proﬁles
constitute strict equilibria. As far as formal equilibrium selection results concerned, we focus on
the adaptive play model, mainly because it is the least analyzed among the three representative
models. The main result oﬀers a suﬃcient condition for stochastically stable equilibrium in an
n-person asymmetric binary coordination game, which leads to a generalization of the existing
result for two-person games. More importantly, the main result is used to derive a multiplicity
result, which states that if the binary coordination game has strategy proﬁles at which two
strategies generate the same payoﬀ, then both equilibria may well be stochastically stable, even
if each strategy pays oﬀ quite diﬀerently elsewhere.
The existence of multiple stochastically stable equilibrium is ﬁrst discovered by Young
(1998) for n-person binary unanimity games played in multi-population random matching. In
several ways our result generalizes that of Young (1998). First, it applies to a general binary
coordination game, which is not necessarily a unanimity game. Second, our result and that of
Young (1998) together show that multiplicity is not speciﬁc to a particular selection dynamic.
On the other hand, in a rare study of equilibrium selection in a many-person game, Kim (1996)
obtains, among other things, a uniqueness of stochastically stable equilibrium for a symmetric
n-person binary coordination game played in single population random matching.
Thus, multiplicity may occur in both adaptive play and multi-population random matching,
whereas it does not in single population random matching. One may suspect that the diﬀerence
is related somehow to the diﬀerence in the dimensions of the respective state spaces. It is not
immediately clear, however, how exactly the diﬀerence in dimension leads to the presence
or absence of multiplicity. We try to answer this question by analyzing appropriate mistake
minimization programs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we oﬀer an intuitive
explanation of the issues and our results. In section 3 we derive preliminary results for adaptive
play of a many-person binary coordination game. The equilibrium selection results are proved
in Section 4. In the ﬁnal section we discuss the source of the aforementioned diﬀerence in terms
of relevant mistake minimization programs.
2k 0 1 2 3
A a1 a2 a3 a4
B b4 b3 b2 b1
G0
k 0 1 2 3
A 0 a2 a3 a4
B b4 0 0 0
G1
k 0 1 2 3
A 0 ε ε a
B a + δ 0 0 0
G2
k 0 1 2 3
A 0 0 0 a + δ
B a ε ε 0
G3
k 0 1 2 3
A 0 0 0 a4
B b4 0 0 0
G4
k 0 1 2 3
A 0 0 0 a
B a + δ ε ε 0
G5
Figure 1: Payoﬀ tables for binary coordination games, where k is the number of other players
who choose A.
2 Intuition behind the results
The game G0 in Figure 1 describes a symmetric four-person game. Strategies are named A
and B, and the table represents the payoﬀ function of a player. The top row shows the number
of other A players. If a player chooses A and there are two others who do the same, then
the payoﬀ for the player is a3, and so on. It is a binary coordination game if ak and bk are
nondecreasing in k and if a4 > b1 and b4 > a1. It follows that (A,...,A) and (B,...,B) are
strict equilibria.
Consider a situation in which players play a game over time. The dynamic is a myopic
best response with mistakes, which we call the prototype. On each day, each player chooses a
best response against the proﬁle realized yesterday, but sometimes one may choose otherwise
by mistake. Let the game they play be G1 and let (A,...,A) be the realized proﬁle yesterday.
Although everyone is supposed to play A today, assume that exactly one of them chooses
B. What will happen tomorrow? If there are no further mistakes, they will return to the
original equilibrium. One mistake is not enough to drive the players to switch their actions.
Alternatively, assume that (B,...,B) was the proﬁle realized yesterday and that exactly one
player makes a mistake today. Then, without further mistakes, players will ﬁnd themselves
at the other equilibrium the day after tomorrow. One mistake is enough to drive them to
switch their actions. Using this type of “mistake counting argument”, let us measure the size
of the “basins of attraction” of each strategy. It is crucial to observe that the size of a basin
1In stochastic evolution analysis, a selection result is explicit if conditions for a stochastically stable equi-
librium are stated only in terms of payoﬀs and other primitives in the stage game, without mentioning any
intermediate concepts such as costs of transition or potential minimizing trees.
3in the prototype depends solely on the best response structure of the given game and is not
related whatsoever to any “enriched” structure, such as random matching in a population or
a truncated ﬁctitious play, into which the given game would be embedded in a full-ﬂedged
stochastic evolution analysis. It is also important to recognize that the mistake counting
argument in the prototype would not discriminate equilibria at all if the given game were a
two-person game, so the issues addressed here are speciﬁc to many-person games.
Thus, we say that A has the larger basin of attraction in game G1. In such a case, is it
natural to expect that a reasonable equilibrium selection criterion would single out equilibrium
(A,...,A)? Not necessarily, since payoﬀs generated by strategy A may not be large enough
compared to that of B. For example, a2 and a3 may be vanishingly small and a4 may be
smaller than b4. Intuitively, even when the basin of attraction of A is large, it need not be
“deep” enough. Thus an equilibrium selection model may determine the outcome as a balance
of the two factors: comparison of the size and depth of the basins of attraction.2 In game G2,
the balance of the two factors boils down to that of ε > 0 and δ > 0. The way these two
parameters work in determining the selection outcome depends on the “enriched” structure, or
the particular dynamic under study.
Working in the adaptive play with mistakes, our main result states that if a strategy has
the larger basin of attraction in the prototype, and if the basin is also deep enough, then the
strategy constitutes a stochastically stable equilibrium. This sounds simple and intuitive, but
it has a somewhat unexpected consequence. For (A,...,A) to be stochastically stable in game
G2, the depth consideration requires that δ should not be as large. Consequently, the main
result implies that there is δ > 0 such that for every 0 < δ ≤ δ and every ε > 0, (A,...,A) is
stochastically stable. Likewise, (B,...,B) is stochastically stable in Game G3. An immediate
consequence is the existence of multiple stochastically stable equilibria: both equilibria are
stable in G4 provided a4 and b4 are relatively close. If the size of the basins is the same, both
equilibria are stable unless the diﬀerence in depth is overwhelming.
Now we return to the prototype. To determine the basin of attraction, we search for
sequences of strategy proﬁles from one equilibrium to the other, and then identify which of
these contains the fewest mistakes. Such sequences contain asymmetric strategy proﬁles in
general. Given a full-ﬂedged stochastic evolution dynamic, consider its state space. If it
contains states that correspond to asymmetric stage game strategy proﬁles, then the mistake
counting in the prototype can be replicated as a mistake counting in the full-ﬂedged model.
2In stochastic evolution models in which the mistake rate or the speed of adjustment is state dependent,
the “depth” of a basin of attraction has been found to be a factor in determining the selection outcome (e.g.,
Binmore and Samuelson 1997, Kandori 1997). When the stage game is a many-person game, our analysis shows
that the depth matters even in state independent models.
4Moreover, such a replication may well be optimal in the mistake minimizing problem in the
full-ﬂedged model. In this way, mistake counting in the prototype may become relevant or
even decisive. The adaptive play is a ﬁctitious play with a ﬁnite memory size, so the player
role in the stage game remains intact. Thus, there is no problem in translating a sequence
of stage game strategy proﬁles into a path of states in the adaptive play. The same is true
for the multi-population random matching model. In contrast, the single population random
matching model is incapable of expressing an asymmetric stage game strategy proﬁle as its own
state, since the player role is absent in the model. Therefore, in the single population random
matching model games G2 and G5 are treated as almost identical provided ε is suﬃciently
small. Thus the mistake counting argument in the prototype can never be a factor.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 The game
There are n players, denoted by i ∈ I = {1,...,n}, n ≥ 2. Each player chooses her strategy
σi ∈ {A,B}. A generic strategy proﬁle is denoted by σ ∈ Σ = {A,B}n. Let |σ|X be the






|σ|A, if σi = A,
bi
|σ|B, if σi = B,
where ai
k and bi
k are functions deﬁned on {1,...,n} such that
(G1) ai
k and bi






The game thus deﬁned is called a binary coordination game. The condition (G1) implies that
the payoﬀ associated with a particular strategy depends only on the number of players who
adopt that strategy. By (G2), both (A,...,A) and (B,...,B) are strict equilibria. Following
Harsanyi and Selten (1988), let us call αi = ai
n − bi
1 the deviation loss of i ∈ I at equilibrium
(A,...,A). The deviation loss at (B,...,B) is βi = bi
n −ai
1. The game is symmetric if players
have identical payoﬀ parameters. If the game is symmetric or n ≤ 3, it has exactly two strict
equilibria. The game may well have more than two strict equilibria in general.
3.2 Convergence in the adaptive play
We employ the adaptive play model of Young (1993) for equilibrium selection. The adaptive
play without mistakes is a dynamic adjustment model in discrete time in which the stage game
5is played once in each period. The state of the dynamic in a given period is the most recent
history (i.e., the sequence of strategy proﬁles most recently realized) of length T. Each player
chooses a best response against her sample, which is a randomly chosen s-length subsequence
of the current state, where s ≤ T. Owing to random sampling, the adaptive play without
mistakes is a ﬁnite-state Markov chain. A notable property of the chain is that a state is
absorbing if and only if it is a T-fold concatenation of a strict equilibrium in the stage game.
The following deﬁnitions and facts from Markov chain theory are relevant to the current
discussion.3 A recurrent class is a set of states that is minimal with respect to set inclusion
among the sets with the property that once the chain enter into the set, it will remain within
thereafter. A ﬁnite-state Markov chain has nonempty recurrent classes. A state is absorbing if
by itself it forms a singleton recurrent class. A chain is absorbing if, starting from any state,
the chain will reach an absorbing state in a ﬁnite number of steps with probability one.
We now introduce some noise as follows. In each period a player may fail to choose a best
response and end up with a random strategy choice with probability  > 0. If the randomly
chosen strategy is not a best response to any sample that might be drawn, then the strategy
is called a mistake. The resulting process is called the adaptive play with mistakes. The
crucial property of the play with mistakes is that it has a unique stationary distribution µ, to
which the distribution of play converges in the long run. Young (1993) shows that the limit
µ∗ = lim→0 µ is a stationary distribution of the adaptive play without mistakes. A state is
stochastically stable if the limiting distribution µ∗ puts a positive weight on it.
In principle, the stochastically stable states can be identiﬁed by invoking the mistake
counting argument. It involves evaluating the resistance from a recurrent class to another,
which is the minimum number of mistakes for the adaptive play to travel from the origin to the
destination. Due to the potential presence of intermediate recurrent classes, the evaluation of
resistance can be quite complex in general. If there are exactly two recurrent classes, however,
the argument is straightforward, as we only need to consider the direct paths from one recurrent
class to the other.
The stochastic stability analysis for the adaptive play generates equilibrium selection results
when the play without mistakes is absorbing. In this case, the stochastically stable distribution
can be viewed as a probability measure on the set of strict equilibria in the stage game.
A strategic game is weakly acyclic if, starting from any strategy proﬁle, a strict equilibrium
can be reached via a sequence of strategy proﬁles such that there is exactly one player who
plays diﬀerently between each proﬁle and its immediate predecessor, and the new strategy is
a best response against the predecessor. Young (1993, Theorem 1) shows that if the stage
game is weakly acyclic, then the adaptive play without mistakes is absorbing with appropriate
3Basic results for ﬁnite Markov chains can be found in, for example, Kemeny and Snell (1976).
6k 0 1 2 3 4
A 0 ε2 ε3 ε4 α
B β 0 0 0 0
u
k 0 1 2 3 4
A 0 0 0 0 α
B β ε4 ε3 ε2 0
v
k 0 1 2 3 4
A 0 0 0 0 α
B β 0 0 0 0
w
Figure 2: Payoﬀs in a ﬁve-person game, in which 0 < ε2 < ε3 < ε4 < min{α,β}.
choices of T and s. One can verify that a binary coordination game is weakly acyclic if it is
symmetric or n ≤ 4. In general, however, it may not be weakly acyclic. In fact, the adaptive
play need not be absorbing.
Example 1. There are ﬁve players. Players i = 1,2 have payoﬀ function u, player i = 3 has
payoﬀ function w, and players i = 4,5 have payoﬀ function v in Figure 2. The ﬁve-person
game has exactly two strict equilibria, because player 3 has a unique best response only if all
the others make a unanimous choice. Now consider the strategy proﬁles (A,A,A,B,B) and
(A,A,B,B,B). Each is a non-strict equilibrium, in which all players but 3 play their unique
best responses. Since all the states consisting solely of these equilibria form a non-singleton
recurrent class, the adaptive play is not absorbing.
In view of this example, it is important to identify a condition that makes the adaptive
play without mistakes absorbing. In addition, we would like to ﬁnd a condition under which
there are exactly two strict equilibria. In this paper, we oﬀer a single condition that ensures
these two desirable properties. To state the condition, we need to introduce some notation.






. In Figure 3, which depicts the payoﬀ
parameters of i ∈ I, the number ki is m − 1. The threshold ki = k means that at least k + 1
others must be present in order for i to play A optimally. Let k = |σ−i|A be the number of
others adopting A and let BRi(·) be the pure best response correspondence. It follows that
BRi(σ) = {B} if k ≤ ki and A ∈ BRi(σ) otherwise. Note that 0 ≤ ki ≤ n − 2 for every ∈ I.
For every k = 0,1,...,n − 2, let
I(k) =









i ∈ I | ki = k
	
.
The ﬁrst set is the set of players for which A is a best response if there are k+1 others who play
A. The second is the set of players for which B is a unique best response if there are k others
who play A. I(k) is the intersection of the two. The key condition concerns the distribution
of thresholds ki.








































0 1 m − 1 m n − m − 1 n − m n − 2 n − 1 ··· ··· ···
Number of others who play A
Figure 3: Payoﬀ parameters in an n-person simple binary coordination game.
In words, (G3) can be explained as follows. Assume that |I(k − 2)| = k and consider any
strategy proﬁle in which every i ∈ I(k − 2) chooses A. By deﬁnition of ki, A by i is a best
response, regardless of what the n−k others do. What about the choices by the n−k others?
Condition (G3) stipulates that there is some j / ∈ I(k−2) such that playing A is a best response
as long as every i ∈ I(k − 2) chooses A.
Lemma 1. If a binary coordination game satisﬁes (G3), then it has exactly two strict equilibria.
For a binary coordination game that does not involve alternative best responses, the converse
is also true.
The proof of Lemma 1 is left to the reader. Recall that the size of a state and of a sample
in the adaptive play are denoted by T and s, respectively.
Lemma 2. For a binary coordination game satisfying (G3), the adaptive play without mistakes
is absorbing whenever s ≤ T/2.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Under (G3), therefore, the equilibrium selection
problem takes the simplest form. Let A and B denote the T-fold concatenations of (A,...,A)
and (B,...,B). The resistance from A to B is denoted by r(A,B), and the resistance for the
other direction is r(B,A). (A,...,A) is uniquely stochastically stable if and only if r(A,B) >
r(B,A). In what follows, we always assume that a binary coordination game satisﬁes (G3)
and that s ≤ T/2.4
4Even if (G3) fails, the results in the next section apply as long as the binary coordination game has exactly
two strict equilibria to which the adaptive play without mistakes converges.
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4.1 Linear program for evaluating resistance
Consider the adaptive play with mistakes for a binary coordination game. The current state is
A. In any path from A to B, there is a player who optimally chooses strategy B for the ﬁrst
time. Let us call that player a ﬁrst deviator. The ﬁrst deviator i ∈ I must have a sample against
which playing B is optimal. Such a sample must contain considerable number of B strategies
played by others. Since player i is a ﬁrst deviator, all such B strategies are mistakes. We set
up a linear program that gives us the minimum number of B strategies that i must face. Its
optimal solution not only gives us the number, but also reveals the way in which mistakes occur.
In many-person games not only the number but also the distribution of mistakes matters. The
linear program introduced below takes care of the case in point.






1 = αi + bi
k+1 − ai
n−k
for k = 1,...,n − 1. Recall that αi = ai
n − bi
1 is the deviation loss at equilibrium (A,...,A).
Note that zi
k is nonnegative and nondecreasing in k. The linear program is as follows:
(Pi
A) minx1 + 2x2 + ··· + (n − 1)xn−1
s.t. x1 + ··· + xn−1 ≤ s,
Pn−1
k=1 zi
kxk ≥ sαi, xk ≥ 0.
In this program, xk is the number of proﬁles that contain exactly k mistakes.
P
k xk is the
number of proﬁles that contain at least one mistake. The ﬁrst constraint comes from the fact
that this number cannot exceed the sample size. The second constraint expands to
bi
nxn−1 + ··· + bi




1xn−1 + ··· + ai




Thus, it ensures that strategy B is a best response against the sample. The objective function
gives the total number of mistakes in the sample. It is clear that (Pi
A) has an optimal solution.
The stochastic stability analysis hinges on the number of mistakes. Do we need additional
integer constraints? For most of our purpose,5 we do not need them, as we only need the
following implications. By the deﬁnition of the ﬁrst deviator, if the optimal value of (Pi
A) is at
least v for every i ∈ I, then v is a lower bound of the resistance r(A,B). If the optimal value
of (Pi
A) is strictly greater than v for every i ∈ I, then the resistance r(A,B) is strictly greater
than v.6
5The only exception is part (2) of Proposition 2.









n−k for every i ∈ I
	
.
In terms of ki, which was deﬁned in Section 2.2, mA = 1 + maxi∈I ki. We are ready to show
the main result of the paper.
Theorem. Consider an n-person binary coordination game. If (A1) and (A2) are satisﬁed,






k ≤ kαi for every k = 1,...,n − 1 and every i ∈ I.
If all inequalities in (A2) are strict, then it is a unique stochastically stable equilibrium.
Proof. Write mA = m. The result is a consequence of the following facts.
(1) Under (A1), the resistance from (B,...B) to (A,...A) is at most sm.
(2) Under (A2), the optimal value of (Pi
A) is at least sm for every i ∈ I. If the inequalities
are strict, then the optimal value is greater than sm.
To prove (1), it suﬃces to construct a path from B to A in which there are exactly sm
mistakes. In Phase 2 in Figure 4, let every player sample Phase 1. All the A∗ strategies in the
ﬁgure are mistakes and there are exactly sm of them. Let i ∈ {1,...,m} and j ∈ {m+1,...,n}.
By deﬁnition of m, al
m+1 ≥ bl





n−m, A is a best response for j. In Phase 3, strategies X ∈ {A,B} by i means that
they are immaterial to the argument. In Phase 4, let i sample Phase 3. Then the respective
strategies yield ai
n−m+1 and bi







m, which allows i to choose A. Letting j sample the
ﬁnal available segment of Phase 2 and the initial segment of Phase 4, we make her choose A in
Phase 4 as well. Finally, note that these sample assignments are possible as long as s ≤ T/2.
To prove (2), pick i ∈ I and consider the program (Pi
A). Take a nonnegative, nonzero
vector (x1,...,xn−1). By (A2),
mzi
kxk ≤ kαixk




kxk ≤ αi P




kxk < sαi, which means that the vector is infeasible. If the inequalities in (A2)
are strict, then the left inequality in (?) becomes strict, which in turn implies that the vector









σ1 B ··· B A
∗ ··· A
∗ X ··· X A ··· A
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
σm B ··· B A
∗ ··· A
∗ X ··· X A ··· A
σm+1 B ··· B B ··· B A ··· A A ··· A
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
. . . ···
. . .
σn B ··· B B ··· B A ··· A A ··· A
Figure 4: Path from B to A.
(x1,...,xn−1) is infeasible, even if the right inequality in (?) is a weak inequality. Thus, in this
case the optimal value is greater than sm.
Part (1) of the proof establishes a link between the discussion on the prototype in Section
2 and the formalism developed here for the adaptive play. The path from B to A constructed
in Figure 4 replicates the sequence from (B,...,B) to (A,...,A) in the prototype in which
exactly m players make mistakes in the ﬁrst period.
What (A1) requires is clear from the deﬁnition of mA; in Figure 3, the two payoﬀ curves
intersect in the left half of the domain. The condition dictates that strategy A has the larger
basin of attraction, in the sense that we used the term in the discussion of the prototype.
Condition (A2), meanwhile, concerns the “depth” of the basins. The notion of depth in
turn concerns the deviation loss, which is deﬁned at each strategy proﬁle to be the diﬀerence
between the best response payoﬀ and the suboptimal payoﬀ. Rewrite (A2) as
(m − k)α ≤ m(an−k − bk+1).
For k = m,...,n − m − 1, as Figure 3 shows, the left hand side is nonpositive and the right
hand side is nonnegative under (A1). This means that the inequality is satisﬁed by (A1) in
the middle part of Figure 3. The genuine requirement of (A2) thus only concerns the left and
the right portions of the ﬁgure. For k = 1,...,m−1, the inequality requires the deviation loss
to be suﬃciently large relative to the equilibrium deviation loss, α. For k = n − m,...,n − 1,
the inequality can be rewritten as
(k − m)α ≥ m(bk+1 − an−k),
which states that deviation loss should not be too large relative to α. In particular, it dictates
that
β ≤
(n − mA − 1)α
mA
,
11which means that the deviation loss at (B,...,B) is not overwhelming compared to the devi-
ation loss at (A,...,A).
In intuitive terms, (A2) requires that the basin of A is relatively deeper than that of B.
We can describe the result as follows. If strategy A has the larger basin of attraction and if
the basin is relatively deep enough, then (A,...,A) is stochastically stable.
Example 2. Consider the n-person linear symmetric binary coordination game in which
ak = a(k − 1), bk = b(k − 1), for k = 1,...,n,
where a > 0 and b > 0. Then mA = db(n − 1)/(a + b)e, where dxe is the least integer that
is greater than or equal to x. Without loss of generality, we may assume that a > b. Then,
ignoring the rounding problem, (A1) holds true.7 It follows from zk = (a + b)k that
mAzk = mA(a + b)k ≤
(a + b)(n − 1)k
2
< (n − 1)ak = kα,
which shows that (A2) is also satisﬁed in strict inequalities. Hence, the unique stochastically
stable equilibrium is (A,...,A). This example indicates that the main theorem generalizes
the entirely natural observation that (A,...,A) is uniquely stochastically stable in the linear
coordination game in which a > b.
4.3 Multiplicity of stochastically stable Equilibria
Interchanging ai
k and bi






1, the main theorem






k ≤ kβi for every k = 1,...,n − 1 and every i ∈ I,




n−k for every i ∈ I
	
.
If all the conditions for the respective equilibria are satisﬁed within a single game, then
multiple stochastically stable equilibria arise. The four conditions are jointly equivalent to the
next two.8
Proposition 1. Consider an n-person binary coordination game. If there is a positive integer
m such that




7If n is either odd or suﬃciently large, (A1) is in fact true.














for every k = 0,1,...,n − 1 and every i ∈ I, then both (A,...,A) and (B,...,B) are stochas-
tically stable.
An important implication of (M1) is that
bi
m+1 = ··· = bi
n−m = ai
m+1 = ··· = ai
n−m.
Following the interpretation we gave for (A1), we take (M1) as stating that the basins of
attraction of the respective equilibria are equal in size.
Roughly speaking, therefore, if the size of the basins of attraction is the same, then both
equilibria are stochastically stable unless one of the two basins is considerably deeper than the
other. In some games, seemingly considerable diﬀerence in depth may not be reﬂected in the
selection outcome. The class of unanimity games oﬀers itself as such an example.
A binary unanimity game is a binary coordination game in which m = mA = mB = 1.










2. Being more general, our deﬁnition qualiﬁes any two-person binary coordination
game as a unanimity game. For unanimity games, a complete characterization of the selection
outcome is available.
Proposition 2. Consider an n-person binary unanimity game, n ≥ 2. If
(1) βi ≤ (n−2)αi and αi ≤ (n−2)βi for every i ∈ I, then both equilibria are stochastically
stable.
(2) there is i ∈ I such that αi > (n − 2)βi or βi > (n − 2)αi, then, assuming that the








The ﬁrst case follows from Proposition 1. The second case is proved in the Appendix.
According to (1), multiplicity arises if βi ∈ [αi/(n−2),(n−2)αi]. As n increases, the condition
becomes increasingly generous. If n = 2, Proposition 1 is not applicable since (M1) fails.
Nonetheless, Proposition 2 remains valid. A well-known result of Young (1993, Theorem 3)
states that risk dominant equilibrium in a two-person binary coordination game is stochastically
stable. For two-person games, (1) fails and the risk dominance is equivalent to the inequality
condition in (2). Viewed thus, Proposition 2 generalizes Young (1993, Theorem 3).
9Recall that when s is small, the mistake counting in the adaptive play may not be able to discriminate
equilibria at all. In the extreme case of s = 1, both equilibria are stable even in two-by-two coordination games.
135 Discussion
We have shown equilibrium selection results from which the multiplicity of stochastically stable
equilibria follows in a class of games. Given a unanimity game with multiple stochastically
stable equilibria, the main theorem implies that each neighborhood of the game contains a game
in which (A,...,A) is uniquely stochastically stable and another in which (B,...,B) is uniquely
stochastically stable, as games G1, G2 and G3 in Figure 1 illustrate. As a correspondence, the
stochastically stable equilibrium is not lower hemicontinuous.10
Now let us return to the prototype in Section 2. Assuming that everyone chose action B
yesterday, how many mistakes today shall allow a player to optimally choose A tomorrow? Let
us say that the answer is m. With m mistakes today, at least one player will choose A optimally.
Do subsequent optimal switches to A accumulate enough to reach the other equilibrium? It
may well be the case that they do. It is such a sequence of proﬁles in the prototype that the
path in Figure 4 reproduces in the adaptive play, and the number m of mistakes required today
translates into a feasible solution in the linear program such as (Pi
A), which was formulated in
Section 4, of the form
(x1,...,xm−1,xm,xm+1,...,xn−1) = (0,...,0,s,0,...,0).
In general, mistakes in the prototype that trigger a transition from an equilibrium to the other
can be embedded into the adaptive play by this type of solutions, which we call corner solutions.
In this way, mistake counting in the prototype carries over to that in the adaptive play. To
understand our selection results, it is crucial to note that a corner solution can be optimal in
the relevant linear program. Roughly speaking, multiple stochastically stable equilibria arise if
corner solutions are optimal in both directions, i.e., from one equilibrium state to the other and
vice versa. Notice that if the stage game were a two-person game, all these considerations would
be irrelevant as the prototype would not discriminate any equilibrium. Thus the relationship
between the prototype and the adaptive play emerges speciﬁcally in analysis of many-person
games.
An entirely analogous relationship can be established between the prototype and the multi-
population random matching model. For simplicity, consider a symmetric n-person binary
coordination game. For each player role j, j = 1,...,n, there is a population Cj consisting of
N agents. The state space of the model is {0,1,...,N}n, which keeps track of the number of
B-players in each population. In each period, an agent in Cj is informed of the state in the
previous period, and is randomly matched with n − 1 agents, each of whom are chosen from a
diﬀerent population, and they play the stage game. The agent intends to play the best response
10This feature reminds us of the equilibrium reﬁnement literature; see, for example, Okada (1981).
14against the previous state, but may occasionally make a mistake. Now set the previous state
be (0,...,0), which corresponds to (A,...,A) equilibrium in the stage game. Focus on an
agent in population Cn and consider what kind of current period mistakes by others allow her
to play B in the next period. Speciﬁcally, assume that exactly xj agents in Cj make mistakes,
j 6= n. Since the previous state is (0,...,0), the current state for the particular agent in Cn is
x−n = (x1,...,xn−1). In the next period, the probability of the agent facing exactly k others











and J = {1,...,n−1}. Now we can write down the nonlinear program that works for evaluating













A feasible solution of the program is called an interior solution if 0 < xj < N for every
j 6= n. Otherwise, it is called a corner solution. Taking this program as the point of departure,
we could derive selection results for the multi-population random matching model by following
the line of reasoning in Section 4. For example, the program takes the simplest form if the stage
game is a unanimity game. In such a case, one can prove that corner solutions are optimal in
both directions, from one equilibrium state to the other and vice versa, if and only if
max{an/bn,bn/an} ≤ (n − 2)n−1,
which is precisely the condition found in Young (1998) under which both equilibria are stochas-
tically stable.
To relate the program to the single population random matching model, we introduce an
extra constraint that
x1 = x2 = ··· = xn−1 = x,
which dictates that populations are indistinguishable from each other. For such states, the







15which is precisely the function that appeared in Kim (1996). With the extra condition, the
program reduces to
minx







xk(N − x)n−k−1(bk+1 − an−k) ≥ 0.
It is obvious that the reduced program always has an interior optimal solution. With just a
single variable, the mistake counting argument in single population model is not capable of
accommodating that in the prototype. In particular, as Kim (1996) shows, multiplicity does
not arise.
These formulations clarify why the prediction of equilibrium selection by mistake count-
ing analysis diﬀers for diﬀerent dynamics. In multi-dimensional state models, the mistake
counting argument becomes richer than that in single population models in that an optimal
solution of the associated minimization program may be a corner solution, which reﬂects the
mistake counting argument in the prototype. Consequently, if two equilibria possess basins
of attraction of the same size in the prototype, then both may well be stochastically stable
in multi-dimensional state models, but they never be in single population random matching
model.
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2
Recall that T and s are the history size and the sample size of the adaptive play, respectively.
Lemma 2 states that the adaptive play without mistakes is absorbing in a binary coordination
game whenever s ≤ T/2. This is a consequence of Lemma 3 below. For deﬁnitions of symbols
and mathematical conditions that appear in the proof of Lemma 3, see section 2.
Lemma 3. In a binary coordination game, the adaptive play without mistakes is absorbing if
T = 2 and s = 1.
Proof. Consider the adaptive play with (T,s) = (2,1). Let σ ∈ Σ be the sample given to i ∈ I
on a particular day. To avoid ambiguities caused by multiple best responses, let the player





A, if i ∈ I(k − 1),
B, if i ∈ I(k),
(?)
where k = |σ−i|A, the number of others that adopt A. Clearly, bri(σ) ∈ BRi(σ).
16Pick σ1 ∈ Σ and assume that each player chooses σi
1 on day 1. Starting from σ1, we
construct a path that leads to either (A,...,A) or (B,...,B). Set |σ1|A = k1 so that we can
depict it, with an appropriate permutation, as follows:
σ1 = (
k1 z }| {
A,...,A,B,...,B).
We can assume that 1 ≤ k1 ≤ n − 1. On day 2, let everyone sample σ1. Following (?), they
play σi
2 = bri(σ1). The outcome of day 2 is σ2. By construction,
• For every i ∈ I(k1 − 2), i ∈ IA(σ2).
• For every i ∈ I(k1), i ∈ IB(σ2).
• For every i ∈ I(k1 − 1), i ∈ IA(σ2) if and only if i ∈ IB(σ1).
Thus σ2 can be written as
σ2 = (













Case 1. k2 > k1. Following (?), let σi
3 = bri(σ2) for every i ∈ I. We show that k3 = |σ3|A > k2.
In σ2, every i ∈ I has at least k1 others playing A. Therefore i ∈ IA(σ3) for every i ∈ I(k1−1).
Hence k3 ≥ k2. If k2 ≥ n − 1, then σ3 = (A,...,A). Thus we can assume 2 ≤ k2 ≤ n − 2.
Claim 1: If I(k1 − 1) ∩ IA(σ1) = ∅ then I(k1) ∩ I(k2 − 1) 6= ∅.
Proof of Claim 1. Assume that I(k1−1)∩IA(σ1) = ∅. It follows that |I(k1−1)| =
k2. If I(k1)∩I(k2 −2) 6= ∅, then I(k1)∩I(k2 −1) 6= ∅. If I(k1)∩I(k2 −2) = ∅,
then I(k2 − 2) = I(k1 − 1). Hence |I(k2 − 2)| = k2. Thus (G3) implies that
I(k2 − 1) 6= ∅. Clearly, I(k2 − 1) ⊂ I(k1). Therefore I(k1) ∩ I(k2 − 1) 6= ∅. k
It follows from Claim 1 that either I(k1−1)∩IA(σ1) 6= ∅ or I(k1)∩I(k2−1) 6= ∅. Therefore,
k3 > k2. Under the sample assignment σi
t+1 = bri(σt) for every i ∈ I, we have shown that
k2 > k1 implies k3 > k2. By induction, the play eventually reaches (A,...,A) if k2 > k1.
Case 2. k2 < k1. This case is entirely analogous to Case 1.
Case 3. k2 = k1 and 2 ≤ k2 ≤ n − 2. In this case, σ2 can be written as follows.
σ2 = (













17If I(k2 − 1) = ∅, then |I(k2 − 2)| = k2. Thus (G3) implies I(k2 − 1) 6= ∅.
Let σi
3 = bri(σ2). Then
σ3 = (













If k3 6= k2, then we can apply either Case 1 or Case 2. Thus we can assume that k3 = k2 = k1.
Then
|I(k2 − 1) ∩ IA(σ1)| = |I(k2 − 1) ∩ IB(σ1)| ≥ 1. (†)
The inequality follows from I(k2 − 1) 6= ∅. For every i ∈ I(k2 − 1) ∩ IA(σ1), let σi
4 = bri(σ2).
For everyone else, let σi
4 = bri(σ3). Then
σ4 = (













By (†), k4 > k2. Following (?), let σi
5 = bri(σ4) for every i ∈ I. We show that k5 = |σ5|A > k4.
In σ4, every i ∈ I has at least k2 others playing A. Therefore i ∈ IA(σ5) for every i ∈ I(k2−1).
Hence k5 ≥ k4. If k4 ≥ n − 1, then σ5 = (A,...,A). Thus we can assume that 3 ≤ k4 ≤ n − 2.
Claim 2: If I(k2) ∩ I(k4 − 2) = ∅ then I(k2) ∩ I(k4 − 1) 6= ∅.
Proof of Claim 2. Assume that I(k2)∩I(k4−2) = ∅. It follows that |I(k4−2)| = k4.
Thus (G3) implies that I(k4−1) 6= ∅. Since k4 > k2, I(k4−1) ⊂ I(k2). Therefore
I(k2) ∩ I(k4 − 1) 6= ∅. k
Noting that I(k4−2) ⊂ I(k4−1), it follows from Claim 2 that I(k2)∩I(k4−1) 6= ∅. Therefore
k5 > k4, which allows us to apply Case 1 for the rest of the play.









3 = br1(σ2) and σi
3 = bri(σ1) for every i 6= 1, we have σ3 = (B,...,B). The second
case can be dealt with analogously.
Proof of Lemma 2. We give a sketch of the proof. Details can be found in Maruta and Okada
(2007). Given a binary coordination game, consider the adaptive play in which s ≤ T/2. Fix
an initial state, which is an arbitrary sequence in Σ with length T. Since s ≤ T/2, there is
σ1 ∈ Σ such that the play reaches the s-length concatenation of σ1 in a ﬁnite number of steps
18with a positive probability. By Lemma 3, in the adaptive play with (T,s) = (2,1), there is a
path starting from σ1 that eventually leads to either (A,...,A) or (B,...,B). It suﬃces to
replicate this path in the current setting. By providing players with appropriate samples, the
replication is possible thanks to the assumption that s ≤ T/2.
A.2 Simple optimal solutions in the relevant program
The next result characterizes the conditions under which (Pi
A) possesses a simple optimal
solution.
Proposition 3. Consider program (Pi
A) for a player i ∈ I in a binary coordination game.
Denote by λ1 and λ2 the Lagrange multipliers for the best response constraint and the sample
size constraint, respectively. The following conditions are equivalent:

































Proof. The result is a simple application of the duality theorem of linear programming. A
complete proof is given in Maruta and Okada (2007).
This result allows us to prove case (2) of Proposition 2. Consider a unanimity game. One
can verify that the resistance r(A,B) coincides with the minimum of the values of the optimal
integer solutions of (Pi
A). It suﬃces to compare optimal values of (Pi
A) and that of (Pi
B), the
programs to evaluate r(A,B) and r(B,A), respectively.
Fix i ∈ I. In any unanimity game, zi
1 = ··· = zi
n−2 = αi. Thus argmin(k/zi
k) ⊂ {1,n−1}.
There are three cases to be distinguished:
Case 1. βi > (n−2)αi. Then argmin(k/zi
k) = {n−1}. Therefore, Proposition 3 implies that
the optimal value of (Pi
A) is (n − 1)sαi/(αi + βi) < s. If the sample size s is large enough









mistakes, where dqe is the smallest integer not less than q. On the other
hand, again by Proposition 3, the optimal value of (Pi
B) is s.
19Case 2. αi > (n − 2)βi. Similarly, the optimal value of (Pi
B) is (n − 1)sβi/(αi + βi) < s and
that of (Pi
A) is s.
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